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ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW IN CHINA:
A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY WRESTLES WITH ITS
ANTITRUST REGIME
Jared A. Berry∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, it appears that 2008 will be a momentous year
for China. For a few weeks that summer, Beijing will become the
focal point of the world, as athletes, media, and sports fans from
around the world converge on the capital city for the Olympic
Games. While the excitement surrounding the Beijing Olympics is
well-founded, the Chinese business and legal community eagerly
anticipates 2008 for another, less obvious, reason—the possible
implementation of China’s proposed antitrust regime. For well over
ten years, China has worked on developing its first set of
comprehensive antitrust laws. Finally, in late 2004, legislative
drafters took the first crucial step towards enactment by submitting
a draft Anti-Monopoly Law to the State Council’s Legislative
Affairs Office. This submission has many Chinese politicians,
lawyers, and judges feeling optimistic that an anti-monopoly law
will be in place when the world comes to China in 2008.
This note describes the long, arduous process that China has
faced in attempting to enact an antitrust regime and analyzes the
current antitrust landscape in Communist China. Part II provides an
overview of the evolution of China’s economy and legal system,
including a detailed examination of events that have influenced the
creation and submission in 2004 of the new proposed AntiMonopoly Law. Part III addresses the likely effects of the proposed
Anti-Monopoly Law and analyzes the probability of it successfully
accomplishing its stated goals of regulating multinational
corporations and reforming state-owned enterprises and
administrative monopolies. Part III also emphasizes challenges,
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both external and internal, that could emasculate the proposed law’s
ability to reach its stated goals and suggestions that could facilitate
effective implementation of antitrust reform in China. Finally, Part
IV summarizes the author’s concerns with communist China’s
ability to effectively implement antitrust. The author concludes that
unless Beijing experiences major philosophical changes, China’s
attempts at regulating monopoly will be unsuccessful.
II. BACKGROUND: CHINA AND ANTITRUST LAW
A. Evolution of the Modern Chinese Legal System
During the past century, the role of the judiciary within the
Chinese legal system has experienced significant changes. In fact,
throughout history, judicial institutions in China have struggled to
find their identity. Traditional Chinese notions of justice emphasize
informal means of settling disputes and imposing sanctions.1 As a
consequence, the philosophies of Confucianism often trumped the
law.2 In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ousted the
Nationalist government and took control of China. The leaders of
the CCP had struggled for many years against local warlords,
Nationalist strife, and foreign imperialism.3 As a result, CCP
leaders neither respected the traditional court system nor considered
the rule of law necessary to create a just, fair, and stable society.4
Moreover, the traditional communist ideology, to which they
adhered, rejected notions of an impartial and fair judiciary.5
Instead, communist ideologues viewed the judicial system as an
institution of the bourgeois used primarily to oppress and exploit
workers and peasants.6 Accordingly, when the CCP gained control
of China, traditional ideas about law quickly became subordinate to
the CCP’s communist philosophy.7

1
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 42–44, 163 (2003).
2
Id.
3
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND
TRADITION 163 (2d ed. 1996).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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Chinese legal systems further deteriorated under Mao Zedong8
as his regime attempted to violently change China’s settled
routine.9 The CCP believed that existing legal institutions were
remnants of the “old society” of “bourgeois-capitalists.”10 As a
result, China’s formal laws and structures were all essentially
destroyed over the course of nearly twenty years.11 This legal
purging occurred because CCP leaders believed that only by
ridding itself of these organs would China become as “red” as they
desired.12
A few years later, the role of the judiciary experienced another
change, this time on a basic, constitutional level. Although China’s
constitution characterized the judiciary as an independent body,
different agencies frequently usurped the functions and powers of
the judiciary at various times throughout Chinese history.
Following the communist revolution, a wide-ranging group of
organizations, such as revolutionary committees, military control
groups, CCP committees, and public security organs, repeatedly
assumed judicial roles and undermined the judiciary’s
constitutional independence.13 Finally, in 1975 the National
People’s Congress adopted a new constitution and officially
abolished the independence of the judiciary by placing it under the
control of CCP rather than state leadership.14
8

Regarding names, this note adopts China’s official system for romanizing
Chinese—the pinyin style. Exceptions apply for names of individuals from Taiwan,
Hong Kong, or Singapore, which, for various reasons, use different systems of
romanization. Additionally, all Chinese names in this note generally follow the
Chinese convention of surname first, followed by the given name. Thus, for example,
President Hu Jintao is properly referred to as President Hu or Mr. Hu, not President
Jintao or Mr. Jintao. In cases where the individual primarily uses an English name,
however, English naming conventions are used, e.g. Jackson Guo is properly referred
to as Mr. Guo. Finally, in some situations, context leaves it unclear as to which is the
individual’s surname. For improper name usages within this note, the author
apologizes.
9
DREYER, supra note 3, at 164.
10
Id. at 168.
11
Id.
12
Id. (explaining that some went as far as advocating the destruction of the entire
legal and constitutional structure in order to purge the CCP of bourgeois leaders).
13
DREYER, supra note 3, at 168–69.
14
See id. at 169. The Chinese communist system, much like that of the former
Soviet Union, divides the CCP and the State or government into separate but parallel
systems. Id. at 87–89. For example, the highest legislative body in the CCP is the
National Party Congress, with various CCP committees functioning at the local level.
Id. at 90. It is mirrored by the government’s highest legislative body, the National
People’s Congress, with people’s congresses also functioning at the local level. Id. at
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In 1978 when Deng Xiaoping ascended to power, China
experienced another shift in its legal system. Unlike previous shifts,
Deng Xiaoping’s influence moved China closer to a formalized
legal system. Prior to 1978, China had molded into a “societal
legal” system15 focused upon widely accepted norms and values of
Chinese society.16 Deng Xiaoping changed the societal legal system
into a more predictable jural system, emphasizing formal, codified
rules enforced by a regular judicial body.17
Like its judicial system, China’s constitution also evolved,
placing increasing value upon independence and equality.18 In 1978
the constitution was changed to affirm the principles of judicial
independence and guaranteed equality before the law for every
social class.19 In 1982 China adopted yet another constitution,
which further strengthened the people’s courts’ independence.20
The 1982 constitution also characterized China as a “people’s
democratic dictatorship” rather than a “dictatorship of the
proletariat.”21 These and many other changes made by the 1982
constitution have since taken root, and China’s legal system today
is largely a conglomeration of the principles embodied in the 1978
and 1982 constitutions.22
Despite the many constitutional improvements of the 1970s and
1980s, many challenges remain. For example, one critical and
defining feature of the current government system is its lack of a
separation of powers.23 China’s political-legal system (zhengfa
xitong) consists of lawmaking, regulatory, and administrative

87–90. Generally, the National Party Congress will convene and enact policies
previously formulated by the politburo Standing Committee, and then the National
People’s Congress will convene and endorse the decisions of the CCP’s congress. Id.
at 90.
15
Id. at 167–69. The initial development of the “societal” versus “jural”
dichotomy in describing the development of Chinese law is attributed to Shaochuan
Leng and Hungdah Chiu. Id. at 185 n.1 (citing SHAOCHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS (1985)).
16
DREYER, supra note 3, at 164.
17
Id. at 169.
18
Id. at 170.
19
Id.
20
See id. at 171. The independence, however, is limited because the CCP may
still interfere with the people’s courts. Id. In addition, the courts at each level are
dependent on the people’s congresses or other bureaucratic agencies for funding,
staffing, and appointments. CHOW, supra note 1, at 195–97.
21
DREYER, supra note 3, at 171.
22
See id. at 169–72.
23
CHOW, supra note 1, at 142–43.
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entities, as well as courts and police.24 All of these entities possess
overlapping legislative, administrative, and judicial authority.25 The
system’s highest level consists of the National People’s Congress,
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and the State
Council. Together, these bodies have supreme legislative authority.
However, the myriad of ministries, administrations, bureaus,
agencies, and departments below this level often possess authority
to legislate within their own jurisdictions.26 As a result, consistent
legal standards have been difficult to achieve.27
While China has made progress in developing its legal system,
it can still make many improvements that would allow the rule of
law to exert a more significant guiding influence.28 These
improvements include insulation of the judiciary from political
controls,29 reduction of corruption,30 and the establishment and
enforcement of laws in basic areas.31
B. The Creation of China’s “Socialist Market Economy”
In the pre-Deng era, the central government managed almost
every aspect of China’s economy, which often led to an
unproductive workforce and a stagnant economy.32 In accordance
with the Soviet model, China’s system ensured that government
ministries controlled and managed every major industry.33 The
creation of such ministries eliminated the need to establish
regulatory measures because the state already controlled each major

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Of Laws and Men, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 15.
29
See id.
30
See Landlords of the World Unite!, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 69.
31
See Beyond a Bail-Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2004, at 13.
32
See generally DREYER, supra note 3, at 138–47; MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC
CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 405–10 (2d ed. 1998).
33
BORTHWICK, supra note 32, at 406. Interestingly, the CCP did not immediately
expropriate all private enterprises upon proclaiming the People’s Republic. DREYER,
supra note 3, at 143–44. Initially, the CCP targeted enterprises that either the
Nationalist regime or individuals in the Nationalist Party ran. Id. at 143. The CCP then
initiated a policy that consolidated remaining private firms into joint state-private
ventures according to industry with the state-appointed management taking the
dominant role. Id. at 144. Finally, in 1955, the CCP began buying out the remaining
capitalist shares in enterprises, thus creating a system of state-owned enterprises.
BORTHWICK, supra note 32, at 406.
25
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industry. Under Mao Zedong’s egalitarian policies, urban workers,
who tended to neglect the quality and marketability of the items
they produced, received an “iron rice bowl,”34 thereby leaving state
enterprises generally overstaffed and underproductive.35
Upon his emergence in 1978, Deng Xiaoping instigated
tremendous economic reforms that put China on the path of
modernization. He began by reestablishing proper incentives in
agriculture.36 Next, he opened China’s light industry to foreign
investment and created special economic zones in the southern
coastal provinces.37 Perhaps Deng’s most important reform was
allowing state enterprises to retain profits (subject to taxation)
rather than continuing to require that they forfeit all their profits to
the central government.38 Deng also initiated a bankruptcy law to
remove failing businesses from the economy. 39 As a result of the
changes implemented by the Deng regime, China’s economy has
experienced a remarkable expansion, averaging approximately nine
percent annual growth during the last twenty years.40
Despite these reform efforts, many state enterprises continued
to lose money and drain the economy.41 China’s bankruptcy law,
for example, continues to be largely ineffectual because the
government is reluctant to apply the law to state enterprises for fear
of the political consequences that could result from the economic
34

The “iron rice bowl,” or tie fan wan, refers to the Communist practice of
providing workers and their families with their essential needs, such as employment in
state enterprises, housing, schooling, and health care, for the rest of their lives.
WILLIAM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 26, 28 (Diane Webb
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1997) (1996); DREYER, supra note 3, at 150. The idea is that
the workers and their families do not have to worry because an iron rice bowl will
never break.
35
DREYER, supra note 3, at 146–47.
36
Philip Bowring, The Next Phase, 2 CAP. TRENDS No. 4, at 3–4 (1997). For
example, Deng allowed farmers who produced more than the set quota to sell the
excess on the free market. DREYER, supra note 3, at 148.
37
Bowring, supra note 36, at 3–4.
38
DREYER, supra note 3, at 151. These reforms resulted in an increase in the
quantity, quality, and variety of goods produced, as factories worked hard to meet
consumer demand. Id. Additionally, workers worked harder and were rewarded with
increased spending power. Id. at 152.
39
Id. at 151.
40
Shi Ting, FDI Shows 15pc Growth Despite Measures to Stop Overheating, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Aug. 20, 2004, at 6.
41
See James McGregor, Closing of China’s Bright Moon Plant Stands Out as a
Sunny Day in the Annals of Beijing Reform, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Mar. 25, 1991,
at 5. In 1991, Chinese economists reported that almost two-thirds of China’s 102,000
state-owned enterprises were losing money. Id.
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displacement often associated with bankruptcies.42 Consequently,
despite their failure to produce profits, technically insolvent state
enterprises continue to receive credit from state-controlled
financiers.43 Beijing’s overall reluctance to act against state
enterprises reflects the fear that disassembling China’s iron rice
bowls would create a reactionary movement, which could threaten
national unity and ultimately undermine the CCP’s dominance.44 In
addition, close ties between the management of state enterprises
and the CCP, combined with a stifling government bureaucracy,
make it harder for the State to instigate the needed reforms.45
Despite the obvious economic problems associated with stateowned enterprises, they are only a small part of an even larger
economic problem in China—administrative monopolies.46
Generally, the term “administrative monopolies” refers to stateowned or state-run holding companies that gain market power
through legitimate legislative or administrative means.47 A common
form of administrative monopoly occurs in China when stateowned enterprises have direct affiliation with a regulatory ministry
that receives preferential treatment.48 Another particularly
damaging form of administrative monopoly occurs when
administrative regions or localities enact local protectionist
measures by creating barriers for the entrance of goods, services,
and raw materials into their regions.49 These administrative

42

James Kynge, Beijing Urged to Adopt Bankruptcy Law, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 22, 2001, at 11. In fact, while insolvent state enterprises survive on continued
financing, the bankruptcy law does not offer similar protection to foreign-owned
firms. Beyond a Bail-Out, supra note 31, at 13.
43
Kynge, supra note 42, at 11.
44
Bowring, supra note 36, at 6–7.
45
Id.
46
See Daniel S. Mason & Athena Hou Jiangxiao, China’s Proposed AntiMonopoly Law: The US and European Perspectives, ASIA L., Nov. 2004, at 11,
available at http://www.zelle.com/sub/C_monop.pdf.
47
Jijian Yang, Market Power in China: Manifestations, Effects and Legislation,
21 REV. INDUS. ORG. 167, 171–72 (2002).
48
Id.
49
Id.; see also Shi nian yi jian xian ming feng mang fan long duan fa zheng shi
bu ru li fa cheng xu 十年一剑显明锋芒反垄断法正式步入立法程序, ZHONGGUO
GONG YE BAO 中国工业报 [CHINA INDUSTRIAL REPORT], June 13, 2005 [hereinafter
Shi nian]. These protectionist measures are widespread and can result in interprovincial trade wars. For example, Mr. Yang cites a trade war between the Hubei
Province and the Shanghai Municipality. Hubei imposed an RMB 70,000 (US$8,464)
duty on residents purchasing Shanghai-produced cars. Shanghai responded by
imposing an RMB 80,000 (US$9,674) licensing fee for all Hubei-produced cars. Jijian
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monopolies often damage the economy through welfare-reducing
practices such as boycotting, discriminatory pricing, compulsory
purchasing, and price collusion.50
C. The Development of Antitrust Regulations in China
The liberalization movement of the 1980s and 1990s created the
need for governmental economic regulation if China was to
maintain the stability of its self-proclaimed “socialist market
economy.”51 Consequently, in addition to bankruptcy law, China
began developing laws to regulate real estate, securities, and
mergers and acquisitions.52 By the mid-nineties, the rise of
consumerism and the influx of activity and investment from large
foreign corporations hastened the call for antitrust laws to keep the
market functioning smoothly.53
Chinese legal scholars offer several justifications for antitrust
law in China. One approach argues that antitrust law is necessary to
prevent economic monopolization of the market and to provide a
governmental check over multinational corporations.54 A second
approach asserts that antitrust law is necessary to maintain
consumer welfare.55 Notably, to achieve this objective, antimonopoly regulations must be applied across the board to all statecreated monopolies, multinational corporations, and domestic
firms.56 A third approach suggests that antitrust law is necessary to
prevent abuse of power by government administrative

Yang, supra note 47, at 172 (citing Monopoly: The Government Seems to be the
Culprit, BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, Dec. 22, 2002).
50
Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 172–73.
51
See DREYER, supra note 3, at 155–57.
52
See, e.g., Xiannian Ye, China Real Estate Market - Laws and Regulations
Concerning Land and Real Estate, CHINA WINDOW, Aug. 1, 2004, http://www.chinawindow.com/china_market/china_real_estate/china-real-estate-market--7.shtml;
ZHIWU CHEN, CAPITAL MARKETS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE CHINA CASE 6–9
(2003), http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/zc25/chinastudytrip/capitalmarketsandlegal
development.pdf.
53
See Rebecca Buckman, China Hurries Antitrust Law; Multinationals Worry
They Will Become Measure’s First Targets, WALL ST. J. (E. ed.), June 11, 2004, at A7.
54
Wang Xiaoye, Report: Anti-Monopoly Law Vital, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 20,
2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/22/content_
367692.htm.
55
Zhu Qiwen, Anti-Monopoly Law Crucial for Consumers, CHINA DAILY, July
12, 2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200407/12/content_
347593.htm.
56
Id.
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monopolies.57 This approach is based on the assertion that, in terms
of distortion of transaction behavior and preclusion of market
competition, administrative monopolies are more damaging to
China’s economy than economic monopolies.58
Despite such justifications, the development of Chinese
antitrust laws has thus far been a piecemeal effort.59 For example,
in 1993 China adopted the Law for Countering Unfair Competition
as its first attempt at antitrust-like regulation.60 This law is akin to a
simple consumer protection law with provisions against price fixing
or bid rigging, bribery, deceptive advertising, and coercive sales.61
In 2003 China adopted a set of new merger and acquisition laws
entitled the Interim Provision for Foreign Investors to Merge

57

Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 175.
Id. Some of the damaging effects referred to include: (1) harm to consumers
(most of the complaints made to the Chinese Consumers’ Association were related to
services of monopolized sectors, particularly postal services and utilities); (2)
increased prices (state monopolies are less efficient and therefore charge higher
prices); (3) inadequate investment (highly profitable sectors are monopolized by the
state, denying firms access to potentially profitable investment opportunities); and (4)
increased corruption (corrupt officials are able to earn excessive profits from
monopoly earnings). Id. at 175–76.
59
See generally Peter Neumann and Jackson Guo, The Slow Boat to Antitrust
Law in China: An Examination of New Regulations on Monopoly Pricing, CHINA LAW
& PRAC., Sept. 1, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.faegre.com/
articles/article_1220.aspx (outlining the step-by-step developments in China antitrust
law from 1980 to 2003).
60
Law for Countering Unfair Competition (1993) (P.R.C.), available at
http://apecweb.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Competition/cncom2.html [hereinafter 1993
Unfair Competition Law]. The 1993 Unfair Competition Law had little practical
impact on firms’ practices because it failed to create a systematic and comprehensive
anti-monopoly framework and it lacked a regulatory or enforcement agency. Jijian
Yang, supra note 47, at 179.
61
See 1993 Unfair Competition Law, supra note 60. Article 1 of the 1993 Unfair
Competition Law declares that the law is enacted “[w]ith a view to safeguarding the
healthy development of the socialist market economy, encouraging and protecting fair
competition, stopping acts of unfair competition, and defending the lawful rights and
interests of operators and consumers.” Id. (emphasis added). Specific provisions of
the law include article 5, which prevents the unauthorized use of trademarks,
enterprise names, and names or packaging of well-known goods. Article 7 prevents
local government agencies from using administrative power either to force others to
buy goods or to prevent entry of outside goods. Article 8 outlaws the use of bribery as
a means to buy or sell goods. Article 9 prohibits engagement in false advertising.
Article 11 prevents the below-cost sale of goods for the purpose of excluding
competitors. Chapter 4 (comprising articles 20 through 32) stipulates the penalties,
including damages and fines, for engaging in a prohibited action. Id.
58
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Domestic Enterprises.62 Under these rules, which are directed
specifically at foreign firms, a foreign investor must seek approval
from the relevant government bureau prior to conducting a merger
when (1) one party’s annual sales in China are above RMB 1.5
billion (about US$180 million), (2) the foreign firm has acquired
more than ten Chinese firms in the same industry in a single year,
(3) either party has a domestic market share greater than twenty
percent, or (4) the post-merger domestic share is over twenty-five
percent.63 The rules also specify under what conditions foreign
investors must report offshore mergers to the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration of Industry
and Commerce (SAIC).64 In addition, the rules provide exemptions

62
Interim Provision for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises
(promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation/ State Admin. of
Indus. & Commerce/ State Bureau of Taxation/ State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Mar.
7, 2003, effective Apr. 12 2003) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (P.R.C.)
(subscription limited source on file with author) [hereinafter 2003 M&A Rules]. As
indicated by their title, the purpose of these rules is to fill a regulatory void until the
government enacts a more comprehensive antitrust law. Thomas E. Jones & Adam J.
Kearney, New Chinese Merger Control Rules with Worldwide Transactional
Implications: The Third Major Antitrust Jurisdiction?, in PLC GLOBAL COUNSEL
COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK 2003/04 103, 103 (7th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.practicallaw.com/jsp/article.jsp?item=32501. Jones and Kearney, of
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, indicate that the delay in the adoption of the
submitted draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law, combined with the adoption of Provisional
Rules for Mergers and Acquisitions and Provisional Rules for Prevention of
Monopoly Pricing, has led to speculation that the drafting process has been delayed by
vested interests. Id. These interests may include the “recently corporatized state
enterprises… projected by policy makers to become the first Chinese multinationals.”
Id.
63
2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62, art. 19.
64
Id. art. 21. The offshore transaction triggers are: (1) a party owns assets within
China which exceed RMB 3 billion (about US$263 million), (2) the sales turnover of
the foreign firm that merges with the domestic party exceeds RMB 1.5 billion in that
year, (3) either party has a domestic market share of over twenty percent, (4) the postmerger domestic share is over twenty-five percent, or (5) a party will either directly or
indirectly hold equity in more than fifteen Chinese firms in the relevant industry as a
result of the merger. Id.
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from antitrust investigations65 but do not provide sanctions and
remedies.66
In late 2003, China also adopted the Interim Provisions on
Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly.67 These rules prevent
entities from achieving market dominance as inferred by a firm’s
“market share in the relevant market, substitutability of relevant
goods, and ease of new entry.”68 Additionally, the rules prevent
price coordination and supply restriction, and prohibit government
agencies from illegally intervening in price determinations.69
However, like the 2003 rules regarding mergers and acquisitions,
the 2003 monopoly pricing rules fail to create civil causes of action
for violations.70
65

Id.; see Jones & Kearney, supra note 62, at 108. Transactions offering any of
the following benefits are exempt from antitrust investigation: (1) improvement of fair
competition of the market, (2) restructuring of a loss-making enterprise with
guaranteed employment, (3) introduction of advanced technology and management
talent, or (4) environmental improvement. 2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62, art. 22.
66
See 2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62; Jones & Kearney, supra note 62, at 108.
Despite China’s attempts to enact antitrust measures through the 1993 Unfair
Competition Law and the 2003 M&A Rules, Neumann and Guo note that the
following factors limit the regulatory effectiveness of the measures: (1) the dominant
interpretation and enforcement role of administrative agencies “in an economy with
significant state ownership” raises conflict-of-interest concerns; (2) the failure of the
regulations to create private causes of action for injuries resulting from anticompetitive behavior forces individuals to go through the relevant administrative
agency to get relief; (3) “Chinese courts have very limited authority to decide
competition- and antitrust-related disputes;” and (4) the Chinese courts’ limited role
will cause them to continue to lack the expertise and experience necessary to be
effective in complex economic and business litigation. Neumann & Guo, supra note
59.
67
Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly (promulgated by
the State Dev. Planning Comm’n, June 18, 2003, effective Nov. 1 2003)
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2003 Monopoly
Pricing Rules]. Robert Lewis, managing partner of Lovells’ Beijing office, believes
that the adoption of the predatory pricing rules indicates that the drafted antimonopoly rules are politically sensitive. Bei Hu, China Unveils Competition Rules;
Observers Fear Political Resistance May Delay Implementation of the Country’s First
Antitrust Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), July 2, 2003, at 1. Hans Au, also an
attorney at Lovells Beijing, recognizes that the adoption of temporary monopoly
pricing rules demonstrates a “turf war” among different CCP departments and
localities. Id.; see also Yong Zhao, Will Protectionists Hijack China’s Competition
Law?, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (London), Jan. 1, 2004, at 21.
68
2003 Monopoly Pricing Rules, supra note 67.
69
Id.
70
See id.; Neumann & Guo, supra note 59. Neumann and Guo argue that the
2003 Monopoly Pricing Rules fail to address the basic problems under the previous
monopoly provisions. Id. To be effective, said pricing rules must be implemented and
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D. Drafting of the Anti-Monopoly Law
In 1987 China’s State Council Legislative Department
established a drafting team to develop anti-monopoly law.71
Nevertheless, drafting on the law did not actually begin until the
early 1990s.72 During the drafting process, the drafting committee
distributed unofficial drafts on a limited basis to groups and
individuals for comment and recommendation.73 These drafts gave
business and legal professionals a glimpse of the anti-monopoly
provisions under consideration.
The 2002 Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law (2002 Draft)
organizes China’s anti-monopoly law into chapters. Chapter 4
regulates market concentration and prevents mergers that eliminate
or limit competition, hinder development of the national economy,
or damage the public interest.74 Chapter 5 addresses administrative
monopolies by preventing certain governmental practices, including
forced purchases and abusive regional measures that hinder the
flow of goods and services.75 Chapter 5 also prohibits the formation
of industry monopolies that interfere with competition or bar entry
into particular markets.76 Chapter 6 calls for an independent
enforced by Chinese regulators and courts, which is a difficult task considering that
the rules do not significantly expand the procedural rights of aggrieved market actors.
Id.
71
Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 180.
72
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Nov. 8, 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Watchdog Excluded]. Initially, the primary
responsibility for introduction of the law rested with the State Economic and Trade
Commission and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), but that
role now rests with the recently instituted Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Yong
Zhao, supra note 67.
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Yong Zhao, supra note 67. See, for example, YEE WAH CHIN ET AL., AM. BAR
ASS’N, JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SECTIONS OF
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE PROPOSED ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2003),
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/divisions/regulation/chin715II.pdf, for the American Bar
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administrative organ to oversee the implementation and
enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.77
In addition, the 2002 Draft defines a “dominant market
position” as one firm having over half of the market, two firms
having over two-thirds of the market, or three firms having over
three-fourths of the market.78 This provision has caused many
multinational corporations in China to worry that their business
affairs may become subject to heavy regulation.79
After nearly ten years of drafting, the committee took the first
step towards enacting legislation. On October 27, 2004, it
submitted its version of the anti-monopoly laws (Submitted Draft)
to the State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office.80 According to

77

Id. ch. 6.
2002 Draft, supra note 74, ch. 3, art. 16. Conversely, the ABA defines
“monopoly” and “dominant market position” in terms of status—whether a firm has
the ability to set its prices in strategic reaction to other firms’ pricing decisions—and
then specify what conduct would be against the law. YEE WAH CHIN ET AL., supra note
73, at 11.
79
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Market, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Jan. 13, 2004, at 1. Companies with
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in Lucky Film, China’s largest film manufacturer; Proctor & Gamble, whose Pantene,
Head & Shoulders, and Rejoice shampoos are the top three brands in China; and
L’Oreal, whose acquisition of the Chinese skincare company Mininurse catapulted
L’Oreal to second in terms of market share. Id. In addition, a recent report by the
SAIC specifically singled out Microsoft and Tetra Pak (a Swedish manufacturer of
packaging for beverages) as a threat to domestic firms in China. Buckman, supra note
53, at A7; see also Mure Dickie, Pressure for Anti-Monopoly Law Grows: Beijing is
Urged to Act Faster on Introducing Legislation to Prevent Competition Being Stifled
by Market Domina, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.) (London), May 26, 2004, at 12.
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(Beijing), Oct. 27, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/200410/27/content_2146394.htm [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law Submission]; Watchdog
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national legislators’ meeting in March of 2006 and during the 10th National People’s
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official reports, the Submitted Draft does not provide for an
independent agency to oversee implementation or to report
violations of anti-monopoly law.81 The Submitted Draft, according
to some reports, also fails to include definitions for important terms
such as “dominant market share.”82 Notwithstanding these
deficiencies, the architects of the Submitted Draft devoted a whole
chapter to regulating administrative monopolies. This chapter
includes provisions designed to prevent government departments
from coercing people into buying and selling products, as well as
provisions to counter local protectionist measures like restrictive
regional trade zones.83 As Chinese companies begin to develop
increasingly significant market share in certain industries, Beijing
has gradually shifted its primary focus away from the prevention of
foreign dominance in the Chinese marketplace to other areas of
economic concern. 84 This change of emphasis may explain the
differences between the previous drafts and the Submitted Draft.
Despite the appearance of progress and unity in moving the
proposed antitrust laws forward, Chinese bureaucracy has once
again proven to be inhospitable to the initial development of much
needed antitrust laws. At the end of 2004, many expected the
National People’s Congress to pass the anti-monopoly laws in
2005.85 However, in early 2005 MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) each
released independent and conflicting suggestions relating to the
Competition Law, also has power in some areas relating to antitrust law. Watchdog
Excluded, supra note 72.
81
Anti-Monopoly Law Submission, supra note 80. There is a noted concern that
the absence of an independent agency will make the laws less effective against both
administrative and economic monopolies possessing strong lobbying power. Id.; see
infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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Webb, supra note 80. Xiong Weihua, chief secretary of the China Rubber
Industry, believes that the way the anti-monopoly laws define monopolization will be
key to the laws’ effectiveness as an industry regulator. Id. According to Shanghai
attorney Victor Gu, a senior associate at the law firm Boss & Young, agreement on a
definition for terms such as “market” and “dominant market position” is being
frustrated by infighting between MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) over which bureau has primary jurisdiction of the
new law. Id.; see infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
83
Watchdog Excluded, supra note 72.
84
Webb, supra note 80. As Boss & Young attorney Victor Gu states, “Beijing is
looking into the possibility that some domestic companies may have monopoly power
in the future.” Id.
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See Cory Huang, NPC Set to Pass Anti-Monopoly Law; A Raft of Legislation
Covering Commercial Activities Is Likely to Be Enacted Next Year, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (H.K.), Dec. 31, 2004, at 13.
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structural framework of the legislation.86 MOFCOM promptly
responded by denying reports that differences regarding the antimonopoly legislation existed among the ministries.87 Thus, China
must iron out some serious administrative wrinkles in its legislative
system before enacting its anti-monopoly laws in a manner flexible
enough to remain responsive to its rapidly growing markets.
III. CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, THOUGH EFFECTIVE AS A
PROTECTIONIST MEASURE, WILL NOT LIKELY MAKE CHINA THE
WORLD’S NEXT MAJOR ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
A. An Anti-Monopoly Law as a Basis for Economic Nationalism
and Control of Non-State Enterprises
Economic development in China is characterized by the tradeoff between improving the economic system through
implementation of liberalizing measures and retaining the
centralized communist political system.88 Any increase in economic
freedom through market liberalization, such as lowering local
participation requirements in joint ventures or reducing government
ownership in state industries, represents a loss of control by the
central
government.89 However,
increasing
globalization
encourages the implementation of liberalizing measures such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) entry agreement. Over the next
ten years, China must honor its obligations to the WTO, which
include continued tariff reductions and increased intellectual
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Zhang Liming 张黎明, Zhong yang san bu wei zheng li fan long duan fa jin
nian chu tai wu wang 中央三部委争立《反垄断法》今年出台无望 [Three Central
Government Ministries Conflict, Anti-Monopoly Law Has No Hope of Being
Introduced This Year], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Bejing), Jan. 11, 2005, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-01/11/content_2442715.htm; see David Fang,
Bureaucrats Stall Anti-Monopoly Law; Three Ministries’ Efforts to Support the
Legislative Process Have Hindered Progress, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Jan.
12, 2005, at 8; Webb, supra note 80, at 1.
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Zhang Liming, supra note 86. Peking University law professor Sheng Jiemin
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unlikely that the legislation will pass this year. Id.
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property protections.90 Thus, centralized government’s hold upon
the economy will continually loosen. Viewed in such a light, the
proposed Anti-Monopoly Law appears less as a means of
promoting competition than as a tool for protecting narrow,
bureaucratic interests.
Early justifications for enacting anti-monopoly laws focused on
preventing multinational corporations from monopolizing the newly
liberalized Chinese markets.91 These justifications were not driven
by worries of multinational corporations acquiring enough market
power to cause harm to consumers or to cause inefficiencies in
market production and resource allocation; rather, Beijing’s policy
makers feared that sophisticated foreign corporations would simply
push un-savvy local competitors out of business.92
Protecting the presence of many local producers in a
competitive market is beneficial to the CCP in two crucial ways.
First, it allows local producers to participate in an evolving and
innovative market, thereby increasing the possibility of capturing
technological expansions domestically. Allowing Chinese firms to
take advantage of protectionist measures that facilitate their growth
into large worldwide firms would also further the CCP’s interest.
The CCP could then gain prestige for having Chinese companies as
world players. Second, the CCP would benefit from dramatic
increases in corporate tax revenue and enhanced stability in
Chinese labor markets via a strong presence of Chinese, rather than
foreign, corporate entities.
Although larger Chinese corporations might present the CCP
with control problems, skillful application of the Anti-Monopoly
Law can solve these challenges. Through selective application of
the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Chinese government could break up
domestic corporations that reach such levels of power that they
could begin to threaten state interests.
Likewise, the CCP must consider the possibility of a
multinational corporation acquiring enough power to rival or
threaten the CCP’s stability.93 By providing the government with a
mechanism for limiting the size of multinational firms, the CCP can
90
See generally Intellectual Property Theft in China and Russia: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees
/judiciary/hju21217.000/hju21217_0.htm.
91
See supra notes 54–55, 57 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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maintain its control over the market as well as ensure its role as the
preeminent societal and political power in China.94
B. Strategic Amputation: Applying Anti-Monopoly Laws Against
State-Owned Enterprises
Several important considerations affect the anti-monopoly
regulation of state-owned enterprises and administrative
monopolies. As a transitional communist economy, the state sector
in China is an important player in both the economic market and
the everyday life of individual citizens.95 Nevertheless, reforming
the state enterprise system is probably the most pressing issue
facing the Chinese economy in the twenty-first century, and the
new anti-monopoly laws represent a tool to accomplish such
reform.96 Unfortunately, China’s track record on reforms is less
than encouraging. Inconsistent application of bankruptcy laws to
reform state enterprises illustrates Beijing’s reluctance to enforce
laws that bear against what are virtually its own organs.97
The major question is whether the government will apply the
anti-monopoly laws to state-owned enterprises, which are primary
characteristics of a communist economic system. Because China
has no separation of powers among the various government
departments, individual departmental interests are difficult to
ascertain.98 Moreover, the historical interplay between a centralized
government system, state-owned enterprises, and Chinese society
suggests that the varied interests regarding such enterprises may not
favorably unify.99
An analogy that is particularly illustrative of the conflicts
involved is that of self-amputation. Self-amputation is a difficult
proposition to face and occurs only when the interest in preserving
the appendage is severely outweighed by the probability that
removing the appendage would be necessary for the survival of the
individual. Similarly, with respect to any single state enterprise, it
is difficult to argue that reform of that enterprise is necessary to the
survival of any single bureau or the bureaucracy as a whole.
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Additionally, to the extent that state-operated enterprises provide
stable employment to a large number of workers, any reforms that
have significant detrimental effects on employment may serve to
undermine the government’s control.100
On the other hand, reform is likely in cases where one agency
has particularly strong interests in conducting reform while the
other agencies harbor only minute interests in preserving stateowned enterprises. Under such conditions, the agency with strong
interests could act unilaterally to instigate reform where no other
agency would likely have an incentive to intervene. This fact holds
particularly true in instances where high transaction costs prevent
effective coordination. Notably, the aforementioned conditions do
not presently exist in China’s bureaucracy. Instead, the current
Chinese bureaucracy can be characterized as existing at two levels.
The higher level consists of an elite group with vast authority (the
Politburo and National People’s Congress). Below it, the lower
level of Chinese bureaucracy consists of many bureaus and
departments, each possessing equal powers vis-à-vis the others.101
This arrangement allows elite authorities to maintain power via the
time-honored divide and conquer strategy of pitting potential
challengers against one another.
Therefore, while the Chinese government is likely to use antimonopoly law to regulate foreign firms and possibly even domestic
firms as a means of maintaining its supremacy, it remains to be
seen whether Beijing will be willing to use anti-monopoly law to
cut off its own appendages for the sake of preserving and
developing the body.102
C. Effectiveness of the Anti-Monopoly Law in Achieving the
Stated Goals
Given China’s historical suspicion of foreigners and foreign
entities in general, Beijing’s willingness to use an anti-monopoly
law against super-corporations, such as Microsoft and Kodak, is
largely unquestioned.103 The more important question is whether
such a law will be an effective tool by which the government can
prevent foreign dominance. Beijing’s effective application of the
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Anti-Monopoly Law against firms hinges on two critical factors:
(1) the way the drafters choose to define key terms like
“monopoly,” “monopolize,” “dominant position,” and “market
share,”104 and (2) the ability of the relevant bureaucracies—
MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the NDRC—to harmonize their interests
enough to administer and enforce the law in a consistent and
singular manner.105
1. Properly defining key terms enables effective enforcement
Early drafts of the anti-monopoly laws incorporate bright-line
rules for determining whether to classify a firm as a monopoly.
According to the drafts’ rules, a monopoly exists when a single
firm controls one-half or more of the relevant market, two firms
control two-thirds or more of the relevant market, or three firms
control three-fourths or more of the relevant market.106 Setting
aside for a moment the otherwise critical issue of defining relevant
markets, such bright-line rules have many benefits. For example,
the rules are easily applied to determine which firms wield
unlawful economic power.107 Once the relevant market is defined,
determining a violation is merely a matter of calculating a firm’s
market share and comparing it to the maximum levels allowed
under the anti-monopoly laws. Because of the ease of calculation
and measurement, firms could determine ex ante and to a high
degree of certainty whether their actions violate anti-monopoly
laws.108 Furthermore, if China’s government desires to regulate
monopolies in order to prevent corporate power concentrations that
could eventually undermine its own power, then bright-line antimonopoly rules provide a simple approach for restraining foreign
corporations that may gain too much economic or social power.
Notwithstanding the early drafts’ apparent benefits, closer
analysis of the bright-line market-share approach reveals several
weaknesses. First, properly defining a firm’s relevant market may
be extremely problematic; how the drafters define a firm’s relevant
market can determine whether it is a monopoly because a firm’s
market share in any given market depends primarily on the level of
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specificity used to define the market.109 For example, the company
L’Oréal can be properly characterized as both a general producer of
cosmetics and a specific producer of mascara, lipstick, or fingernail
polish. Corporations like L’Oréal that are both general and specific
producers may hold a dominant position in the overall industry
(cosmetics, etc.), but may not hold a dominant position in the
market for any given individual product (mascara, etc.). Thus, in
determining whether a monopoly exists under the bright-line
market-share approach, the focus shifts from measuring market
power to the key issue of defining the relevant market.110
In theory, determination of a monopoly market share in a
certain industry involves relatively simple calculations—either a
firm has reached the threshold levels or it has not. In practice,
however, any firm accused of exceeding the requisite level of
market power will likely respond with the argument that regulators
have improperly defined the firm’s true market. The L’Oréal
example is particularly illustrative of this trend. A hypothetical
complaint might allege that L’Oréal’s cosmetics sales amount to
over fifty percent of the cosmetics market in China. L’Oréal could
respond that the relevant market is actually that of beauty products,
which would also include other products such as hair products in
addition to cosmetics. Under that definition, L’Oréal’s sales might
then amount to only thirty-seven percent of the market. The
potential for regulated parties to play with definitions ultimately
places the burden of determining proper definitions on the
judiciary—a burden that bright-line rules are specifically designed
to avoid.
Furthermore, even if the Chinese government were to establish
an easy-to-apply rule for defining a market, the bright-line
approach will likely be over-inclusive and, therefore, ineffective in
accomplishing the CCP’s goals. For example, assuming that
Beijing’s true goal is to prevent large concentrations of power in
the hands of foreign corporations, the bright-line approach might
prove counterproductive because its application could implicate
many corporations that pose no threat to the CCP’s power.111
Admittedly, if an international computer operating system
manufacturer were to capture eighty percent of the Chinese market,
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it could pose a significant threat to the CCP’s power.112 On the
other hand, it is difficult to imagine an international company with
eighty percent market share in the yellow wooden pencil industry
as having the capability to pose an equivalent threat.
Consequently, it is essential that the legislature clearly define
the key terms to enable effective enforcement of the anti-monopoly
laws and to avoid confusion. Further, legislation must include
practical definitions for relevant markets that are not overinclusive.
2. To be effective, the bureaucracies must work together
Within any regulatory scheme, establishing an effective
enforcement mechanism is vital to achieving the regulation’s
purposes. The complex structure of China’s government morphs
regulation and enforcement into complex issues of coordination
among a dizzying array of bureaus with overlapping authority.113
With regard to anti-monopoly laws, China’s overlapping
bureaucracies pose a particularly acute problem.114 For instance,
three bureaus—MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the NDRC—have
already claimed responsibility over all or part of the AntiMonopoly Law.115 There are some indications that bureaucratic
infighting plays a factor in the legislation’s delay.116 If these
indicators are credible, it is unlikely that these three agencies will
be able to come together to effectively regulate or otherwise
enforce the Anti-Monopoly Law.117 Therefore, unless Beijing
establishes an independent agency to oversee anti-monopoly
regulations, it is likely that the three agencies will maintain their
jurisdictional claims over anti-monopoly enforcement, thus creating
a compliance nightmare for both the government and businesses.
For businesses, dealing with several regulating agencies could
prove very difficult and costly. With three different agencies
independently creating guidelines for anti-monopoly regulation,
businesses would have no choice but to negotiate all three sets of
inevitably constricting and conflicting guidelines. Businesses
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would sit in the unsavory position of following one agency’s set of
guidelines at the expense of another’s. As a result, firms would
inevitably run the risk of incurring non-compliance sanctions.
Firms would also likely face a stifling level of combined oversight
from all three independent agencies, each zealously regulating and
pursuing its own unique brand of antitrust violations.
Having three agencies regulate monopolies also presents the
government with its own set of vexing issues. Multiple agencies
independently propagating regulations will inevitably generate
inconsistencies in interpretation and, ultimately, in enforcement of
anti-monopoly regulations.118 Such inconsistencies could
undermine the purposes for originally enacting the law. Conversely,
the three monopoly-regulating agencies could create a free-rider
problem. In such a scenario, each of the agencies would expect the
other two agencies to enforce the anti-monopoly laws and none
would take action. The resultant free-riding would engender underenforcement of anti-monopoly laws.
One arguable weakness of the free-rider scenario is its
underlying assumption that individual agencies derive utility from
not enforcing the law. A more realistic approach recognizes that
individual agencies derive utility from increases in bureaucratic
power gained through enforcement. Under this paradigm, the three
competing bureaucracies would tend to over-enforce anti-monopoly
regulations, effectively stifling market growth and stemming the
tide of crucial foreign investment.
Given the potential problems with bureaucratic overlap and
free-riding, the most efficient regulatory remedy would be to
establish a single, independent agency charged with enforcing antimonopoly regulations.119 A single, independent agency could
effectively eliminate competitive enforcement problems by
consolidating enforcement powers into a centralized entity. Such
consolidation would also eliminate inconsistent anti-monopoly
guidelines and facilitate the kind of predictable regulatory
environment upon which economic growth depends.
3. Consumers must enter the equation
It is troubling to note that consumer interests play such an
insignificant role in the development of Chinese anti-monopoly
118
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law. Because the Chinese government is not popularly elected, its
responsibility to the general public is tenuous. Accordingly,
consumer interests rarely translate into policy. Moreover, Chinese
consumers have little recourse since they cannot remove officials
who do not act in the consumers’ best interests.
This is not to say, however, that consumers have nothing to
gain from China’s proposed antitrust law. Indeed, one of the
primary purposes of antitrust law is to increase consumer welfare
by making the market more efficient.120 The ultimate effects of
monopolies on the market are lower output and higher prices, both
of which directly impact consumers—whether individuals,
businesses, or even government.121
China must develop a means of ensuring that individual
consumer interests—especially those outside of government and
business interests—are adequately represented in the processes of
developing and enforcing anti-monopoly laws. The most obvious
method of protecting consumer interests is to give consumers a
democratic voice in China’s government. However, as the Chinese
government has ruled out true democratization as a matter of
policy, this solution does not seem feasible. Another possible
solution involves the formation of a consumer protection agency
dedicated to representing consumer interests in the adoption and
enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law. Such an agency could
work as a coequal with the agency that possesses jurisdiction over
antitrust laws to ensure that antitrust law enforcement serve
consumers’ best interests. In order for the consumer protection
agency to be effective, it must be directly responsible to consumers.
Agency accountability, whether accomplished through elections of
non-partisan representatives or other means, must establish the
agency’s primary duty to consumers and should include remedies
for violations of that duty. In the absence of such public
accountability mechanisms, the agency would quickly become like
any other Chinese government bureau—acting in its own
bureaucratic self-interest with little incentive to act otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
China has taken great steps towards reforming its legal and
economic systems, but it still needs many more reforms. Although
120
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it is slowly progressing towards adopting a comprehensive and
workable antitrust law, effective antitrust regulation is one step that
has thus far eluded China. While it seems inevitable that China will
pass the Submitted Draft, it is unclear whether that law will
effectively achieve the government’s complex and often conflicting
antitrust goals.
As China inches closer to passing antitrust legislation,
multinationals must continue their vigilance as the law will likely
reflect the CCP’s historically protectionist tendencies and will
probably be designed to maintain government control over
multinationals. Therefore, companies wishing to do business in
China should expect to face significant legal compliance costs and
to incur penalties for possible antitrust violations.
Just as it is foreseeable that Beijing will use the Chinese AntiMonopoly Law to restrain multinationals, it is equally foreseeable
that Beijing will be disinclined to use the Anti-Monopoly Law as a
tool for reforming state-owned enterprises, particularly where
reformation could lead to unemployment. Such selective
enforcement may allow certain large firms to earn and cultivate
favor with the government and thus escape regulation. As a result,
China would continue to have large enterprises with significant
government ties—a situation the antitrust regulation is supposed to
alleviate.
The Anti-Monopoly Law’s effectiveness in achieving any of the
government’s intended purposes depends largely on how it defines
key terms in the provisions and whether China’s burgeoning
bureaucracy can unite in enforcing the law. For China to become a
significant antitrust jurisdiction, it must adopt a regime that applies
equally to all enterprises (domestic and foreign) in theory and in
practice. An independent agency with the power to tackle violations
when and where they occur must also administer the law.
Ultimately, the drafting and implementation of antitrust laws must
be guided by the goal of promoting consumer welfare and
economic efficiency. Unfortunately, China’s forthcoming antimonopoly laws do not appear to be such a regime.
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